This is fine, but feels like a watered down version of other works by political theorists...

Typically brilliant analysis by Judt, who was already deep in the grip of ALS when he wrote this book. Being a former Marxist though, Judt suffers the myopia of his background when analyzing why socially democratic policies fell out of favor with the Anglo-European west. He can't understand why large populations would fall back on nationalist tendencies and not ascribe to the state the wealth created over the last 30 years if it results in really good public rail travel. That's a snarky simplification of his views. Judt anticipates Trumpism in that he understands that hypernativism breeds fear and calls for ever more spectacular personalities to satisfy the fantasies of its adherents. He also understands, as do many, that human beings grow tired of life without purpose and higher ideals.What he doesn't get, for starters, is the effect that rapidly changing technology is having and will have on workforces in all nations. Strangely enough, the loss of jobs due to mechanization and robotics may yet resuscitate Marxism, because it will breed resentments against corporations and against those who stand to make the most money. Which brings me to his second problem - Judt fails to realize that the gap between rich and poor is not as big an issue for some if the standard of living for all is elevated. A society which restrains growth while at the same time protecting some from poverty breeds resentments - often at both ends, because it largely holds all in place. Even he admits that we all want to feel as though we are headed "somewhere." Judt makes a case for the great Western democracies and the social spending they undertook after World War II, but can't explain why that social spending was resented by the people who gained the most from it. Being a part of the Baby Boom generation, he can explain from experience the catalyst for some of the discontent of that generation, but he can't account for it. He mentions in passing the excesses of Scandinavian socialist states but does not see those excesses tied to the system, as others would. He is right in understanding that the kind of European socialism that supposedly works is aided by homogeneous cultures. Larger areas, with multicultural populations, have a tougher time. His worldview is also disconnected because of its universalism and cosmopolitanism. Most people do not know multiple languages, have a storehouse of information from multiple degrees, nor long for the conveniences of cities that hold millions. For many, the local will always hold more of an attraction, and the simpler will sustain them. This explains why he seems mystified by the enduring attraction of religion. The book also suffers, in some way, because its concerns are tied to the economic collapse of 2008, making it seem in some parts dated. Being a European, Judt sees the French Revolution - with its emphasis on reason - as the great leap forward for humanity, not the American Revolution. The American one may be compromised by slavery, but not fatally, judging by the nation that endures. The French Revolution's bloody excesses, as well as its outcome, should give pause. There is a reason the Leninists of 1917 emulated the French. Judt's style and depth of thought, though, overcome some of these limitations because he has the perspective of history to draw on, and a brilliant mind to synthesize large concepts into tight paragraphs of information and opinion. It's worth reading.

Last night I told a lawyer that I was a professor in a department of Liberal Education. He took this to mean that I taught people to vote Democrat, although he wasn't so completely oblivious to assume that that meant I myself voted Democrat. He went on to describe his experience in a 'Peace and Justice' university course, which he'd thought would be about world war II, but ended up being, and I quote, "propaganda way to the left of Communism". Anyway, lucky for both of us that I hadn't read this book before we had that conversation, or I might have tried to throw him out of a window. I would have failed, and been punched in the face. As for the actual book: three stars for the argument plus one for the style. It already feels like a period piece (it doesn't help that chapter six has as an epigraph a quotation from Dominique Strauss-Kahn. That's a bit uncomfortable); I can imagine that history professors in sixty years time - should any such beings still exist - would set this for their class 'Intellectual History of the Great Financial Crisis.' The prose is practically transparent, the argument is quite clear, and, although it's a little repetitive, there isn't too much padding. I could've done without the paean for trains, much as I appreciate them; and there's some slightly silly guff about how going to the Nationalized post office to wait in line with your fellow citizens makes everyone into one big happy family. But other than that, it's a great read. The argument itself is a good one, hence my narrowly avoided defenestration of a 'conservative.'* Judt points out the great good that post-war social democracy did for most people in the developed world, and suggests that the parliamentary left actually defend that heritage, rather than cringing when it's brought up. He glosses over the failures of the post-war governments (i.e., stagflation), which is a shame- I would have liked to see a well put together argument showing that the economic turmoil of the seventies was due to contingencies rather than due to social democracy as such. I sometimes felt like I'd read it before, in part because I have. The first chapter is taken more or less from 'The Spirit Level,' which I skim-read. The second and third chapters are highly condensed versions of Judt's own magnificent 'Post War,' with additional material on America. High points include the historicisation and of the Austrian godhead of contemporary economics (e.g., Mises' main aim was to avoid Nazism; he blamed Nazism on Communism; therefore we must avoid Communism: is that really a solid foundation for your thought?) and the general good advice that some things can only be done by government, and to assume that government can't do anything is no less ideological than the Stalinist assumption that government ought to do everything. Of course, Edmund Bourke thought that too.* Finally, two great quotes:The 'reduction of society to a thin membrane of interactions between private individuals is presented today as the ambition of libertarians and free marketeers. But we should never forget that it was first and above all the dream of Jacobins, Bolsheviks and Nazis: if there is nothing that binds us together as a community or society, then we are utterly dependent upon the state.''It is the Right that has inherited the ambitious modernist urge to destroy and innovate in the name of a universal project. From the war in Iraq through the unrequited desire to dismantle public education and health services, to the decades-long project of financial deregulation, the political Right has abandoned the association of political conservatism with social moderation which served it so well from Disraeli to Heath.'** Yes, I'm referencing this three times. By calling my lawyer friend a 'conservative' I of course mean liberal. American liberals insist on calling themselves conservative, even though they are knee-jerk, ideological free-marketeers who despite the very idea of community. And it's time to call people on that nonsense.